If you’re nodding along thinking H.4292 sounds reasonable, hang tight. We’d like a shot at changing your mind.
H.4292, Roadway Protection and Safety Act, is yet another bill that will lead to unintended constitutional consequences, which you could clearly see once you start reading the bill.
What is this bill about? Per the Fiscal Impact:
“This bill creates the Roadway Protection and Safety Act and establishes penalties for participating in, organizing, and spectating, aiding, or abetting a “street takeover,” defined as the deliberate and coordinated obstruction of a public roadway, highway, intersection, or parking lot for illegal vehicle exhibitions including, but not limited to, burnouts, drifting, doughnuts, speed contests, or other reckless driving maneuvers.”
The first problem is with the phrase “unauthorized deliberate and coordinated obstruction”.
Using the basic dictionary definition, each word means:
Unauthorized: Means without legal permission.
Deliberate: Implies intent; the obstruction is purposeful, not accidental.
Coordinated: Suggests planning or agreement among multiple people.
Obstruction: Blocking or significantly impeding normal traffic flow.
Now, let’s ask, who will determine that on the spot? The answer is the responding law enforcement officer. Ouch!
You see where this goes? One officer’s “deliberate obstruction” is another’s peaceful protest. How much blockage is too much? Who decides what’s deliberate?
And it doesn’t stop there. The bill is packed with sections that hand out even more snap-judgment power. Such as in section 2 (2)-(11). For instance, let’s pick one.
(4) "Aider or abettor" means a person who assists in planning, coordinating, or physically aiding a street takeover, including, but not limited to, blocking roads, selling concessions, collecting entry fees or spectator ticket fees, or directing vehicles.
“But not limited to” language gives law enforcement unlimited discretion beyond those four examples, creating vagueness issues. That is a major constitutional violation red flag.
The First Amendment protects your right to protest on public streets. H. 4292's "Aider or Abettor" definition criminalizes "blocking roads" and "directing vehicles" with no exemption for protected assembly. A protest march, a peaceful demonstration, a crowd gathered on a public street, and all of it fits the bill's definition. What in H. 4292 will prevent a law enforcement officer from treating a protest as a street takeover?
Remember Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham (1969), where the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance requiring permits for street marches, holding that public streets are protected spaces for assembly and expression?
Let’s grab another example.
(2) "Participant" means an individual operating a vehicle, riding as a passenger, or engaging in activities with the intent to contribute to a street takeover.
Hello, major Constitutional Problem with this language.
Have you ever heard of mens rea (criminal intent)? In criminal law, the government usually has to prove two things: Actus reus (the act itself) and Mens rea (the intent behind it). The core mens rea problem in H. 4292's "Participant" definition (Section 56-5-3910(A)(2)) is that the bill says it requires intent ("with the intent to contribute") but then includes conduct that requires no overt act to support that intent, particularly riding as a passenger.
How will the state prove a passenger intended to contribute rather than simply being in the wrong car at the wrong time? For instance, did the passenger get in the car specifically to attend a takeover? Did they know where they were going? Did they ignore or miss warning signs?
Then there is the trier of fact problem. The trier of fact is the person or group in a court proceeding responsible for deciding the facts of a case.
H. 4292 asks the trier of fact to answer questions the bill itself never answers. This bill leaves it to a judge or jury to decide what was going on in someone's mind. That means two people in identical situations could get completely different outcomes.
Sections F through H are a due‑process problem. The state can seize a person’s car before guilt is proven, keep it while towing and storage fees accumulate, and then forfeit the vehicle to the very agency that seized it, allowing that agency to keep or sell the car and use the proceeds, without clearly spelling out any hearing right in that language.
And once again, SC already has multiple laws on the books that cover virtually everything H. 4292 claims to address. So why the need for H. 4292, which creates new constitutional vulnerabilities while simultaneously weakening effective laws?
Bottom line: H.4292 is a hard no.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not constitute legal or professional advice. ConservaTruth assumes no liability for any actions taken based on this content. Read more.
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